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DEAD HANDS AND STATE ACTORS: THE
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY CHARITABLE TRUST
IN HERMITAGE METHODIST HOMES
Dean Barclay'

like odorous bodies, have a double existence both solid and
"Prejudices ....
subtle-solid as pyramids, subtle as the twentieth echo of an echo, or as the
memory of hyacinths which once scented the darkness... Mr. Casaubon had
taken a cruelly effective means of hindering her: even with indignation
against him in her heart, any act that seemed a triumphant eluding of his
purpose revolted her."2

I.

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

In the 1990 case of Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust
Company,3 Virginia's Supreme Court let a private school's interest in a
charitable trust come to an end because the school began admitting African
Americans.4 The court thereby kept alive the testamentary wishes of a man
who had died more than twenty years earlier.5 Poetically, this outcome may
have been just; the same racism that for two decades the school had exploited6
defeated it in the end. On a positive note, the school regained its dignity, by
washing its hands of unclean money and so atoning for past transgressions.
While cleansing the school, though, the decision tacitly, by omission,
implicated the court itself; that is, the court reached its conclusion "without
deciding" whether enforcement of the testator's will and codicil violated the

1. J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2002. The author wishes to
thank his family and friends, Professors Halper, Henneman, and Massie, and the editorial board of the Race
and Ethnic Ancestry Law Journal for their encouragement and guidance.
2. GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH, BK. V, "Mhe Dead Hand," 300,342 (Bert G. Hornbeck,
ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1874) (describing widow's feelings about codicil that would divest her of
late husband's property if she married certain young man).
3. 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990); see Jonathan L Entin, Defeasible
Fees, State Action, and the Legacy of Massive Resistance, 34 WM. & MARY L REv. 769,796 (1993) (using
Hermitage MethodistHomes to illustrate problems with traditional approach to defeasible fees).
4. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740,746 (Va. 1990) (stating
that, after black student matriculated, natural operation of will's special limitation terminated school's
interest in trust's income).
5. See id. at 741 (reporting that testator Jack Adams died in 1968).
6. See id. at 742 (reporting that trust's first-named beneficiary, private school admitting only whites,
received trust's income from 1968 until 1987).
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United States Constitution. 7 Rather, the court based its opinion on "principles
of real property law," which divested the school of equitable title by a "natural
operation" of the will's "four corners. ' In so ruling, the court applied the
avoidance doctrine, as articulated by Justice Brandeis: "Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter."9
The Virginia Supreme Court's use of the avoidance doctrine showed
amnesia, given the deeper history beneath Hermitage Methodist Homes:
Prince Edward County's gargantuan struggle between 1951 and 1987 to thwart
integration of its schools-a struggle called Massive Resistance.10 That history
began in 1951, when African American school children in Prince Edward
County first filed a suit arguing that Virginia's segregation laws violated the
United States Constitution." In 1952, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia ruled against the children and found that the
Commonwealth could educate white and non-white children in separate but
equal public schools. 2 The court also, however, ordered the county school
board to remove any inequality between public facilities for white and nonwhite students "with diligence and dispatch."' 3 Appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, the case became part of the first Brown v. Boardof Education
7. Id. at 744 (stating that court would only assume but not decide that racially discriminatory
provisions were unconstitutional and void).
8. Id. at 744-48 (stating that principles of real property law produced same result whether
discriminatory provisions were valid or not).
9. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, I., concurring)
(stating that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of"). Note, however,
that another of Justice Brandeis's avoidance rules, "The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits," id. at 348, may also come into play
here. That is, the Prince Edward Foundation was itself questioning the constitutionality of a testamentary
provision from which it had benefied for nearly two decades. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d
at 742. Even so, a party may argue "alternately" and "regardless of consistency," FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
In addition, two of the three educational institutions to whom the will's successive gifts over had previously
delivered no money also questioned the terms' constitutionality. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387
S.E.2d at 742-43.
10. See Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenesfrom the Southside: A DesegregationDramain Five Acts, 19 U.
ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L J. 327, 346 (1997) (dramatizing how Prince Edward County's segregationists, trying
to prevent integration, closed all public schools and replaced them with private ones).
11. See Davis v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Va.
1952) (paraphrasing plaintiffs' argument that Virginia's separation of white and non-white children in public
schools violated Privileges and Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clause).
12. See id. at 340 (stating that federal court lacked authority to adjudge as right or wrong Virginia's
separation of white and non-white children in public schools); compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
550-52 (1896) (stating that separate but equal facilities did not violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment, or stamp African Americans with badges and
incidents of slavery in violation of Thirteenth Amendment).
13. Davis at 340-41 (ordering county school board to remove inequality in public buildings and
facilities provided separately to white and non-white students).
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(Brown 1),4 which held that separate educational facilities were inherently
unequal, and that their maintenance by governmental authority violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 5 In 1955, therefore, the
United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to enter such orders as necessary and proper to end racial
discrimination in public schools "with all deliberate speed."' 6 Rather than
comply, the Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County closed all its
public schools and let the people replace them with private ones.' 7 An
amendment to the Virginia Constitution at that time 8 empowered the General
Assembly and local governments to shut down integrated public schools, to
stop funding them, to pay tuition grants instead to children attending
nonsectarian private schools, and to extend state retirement benefits to the
private schools' teachers.' 9 At precisely this moment, in 1956, the testator in
Hermitage Methodist Homes executed the first version of his racially
discriminatory will.'
In 1962, the same United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia held that the county could not lawfully close its public schools to
avoid the Supreme Court's order while the Commonwealth permitted other
public schools to remain open at taxpayers' expense.2 One year later,
however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld as valid under state
law the closing of the Prince Edward County public schools; state and county
tuition grants for children who attended private schools; and the county's tax
concessions to those who contributed to private schools. 22 In 1964 the
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See Brown v. Board of Ed. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (holding that segregated
public schools were unconstitutional, because their very existence promoted inequality).
16. See Brown v. Board of Ed. (Brown ll),
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (remanding case to district
courts to enter such orders as necessary and proper to admit non-whites to public schools with both care and
dispatch).
17. See Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349, 350 (E.D. Va.
1962) (reporting that Board of Supervisors had shut down public schools).
18. VA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 10 (numbered § 141 in 1956) (generally prohibiting appropriation of
public funds to educational institutions not owned or exclusively controlled by Commonwealth or political
subdivision thereof, but allowing exception for Virginia students' education in nonsectarian private schools);
responding to Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Va. 1955) (concluding that public grants to children
attending private schools violated § 141 of Virginia Constitution, as it stood in 1952).
19. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-188.3 et seq. and 511-111.38:1 (1956) (closing segregated public
schools and effectively replacing them with private ones) (repealed by Acts, 1959 Ex. Sess., c. 53); cited
in Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 221 n. 2 (1964) (describing
legislation by which General Assembly prevented desegregation of public schools).
20. Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740,741 (Va. 1990) (reporting
that Jack Adams executed his will in 1956).
21. See Allen, 207 F. Supp. at 355 (holding that Prince Edward County could not lawfully close its
public schools to avoid Supreme Court's order, while Virginia permitted other public schools to remain open
at taxpayers' expense).
22. See County School Bd. of Prince Edward County v. Griffin, 133 S.E.2d 565, 579-80 (Va. 1963)
(upholding as valid under state law Prince Edward County's closing of its public schools, tuition grants to
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Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged Virginia's authority to
interpret its own laws' but also held that closing the Prince Edward County,
public schools while giving tuition grants and tax concessions to assist white
children in private segregated schools denied non-white students the equal
protection that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed.24 By way of remedy,
the United States Supreme Court directed the District Court to end the
county's racial discrimination by such means as (a) enjoining Prince Edward
County's Board of Supervisors, its School Board, its Treasurer, and its
Division Superintendent of Schools, as well as Virginia's Board of Education
and its Superintendent, from paying tuition grants and giving tax credits while
public schools remained closed; (b) requiring the Supervisors to levy taxes;
and (c) ordering the county to reopen its public schools without racial
discrimination. 25 That same year, 1964, the testator in Hermitage Methodist
Homes executed the codicil to his racially discriminatory will.'
During the two decades after the testator's death in 1968, the Prince
Edward School Foundation fought a related battle to regain its tax-exempt
status, which the IRS revoked with the courts' help beginning in 1970.27 For
purposes of this argument, the key historical moments were 1956 and 1964.
A person does not become a state actor solely because he or she racially
discriminates during the same decade and in the same county as does the
government.28 But in this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia, through its
children attending private schools, and tax concessions to those who contributed financially to them).
23. See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,230 (1964) (conceding
that state court's validation of school closings, tuition grants, and tax breaks was definitive and authoritative
holding of Virginia law, binding on United States Supreme Court).
24. See id. at 232 (holding that closing public schools while financially assisting white children in
private segregated schools violated Equal Protection Clause).
25. See id. at 233 (directing district court to find and implement means necessary and proper to end
county's racial discrimination in public education).
26. Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Va. 1990) (reporting
that Jack Adams executed codicil in 1964).
27. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (holding that, when nonprofit private
schools prescribed and enforced racial discrimination, IRS could disqualify them as tax-exempt
organizations under 26 U.S.C. §§ 170 and 501(c)(3)); Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. Commissioner, 478 F.
Supp. 107, 113 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding that school by failing to admit non-white students had failed
affirmatively to show that it did not racially discriminate), cert. denied 450 U.S. 944 (1981) (Rehnquist J.,
dissenting); Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster Sch., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1973) (stating that
42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private schools from excluding qualified children solely because they were
black), affd sub nom Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1978); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150, 1157 (D.D.C. 1971) (doubting whether educational organization that practiced racial discrimination
could qualify as charitable trust under general trust law), affd in partsub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (ruling that private school having racially discriminatory policy
as to students was not charitable within common law concepts reflected in 26 U.S.C. §§ 170 and 501 (c)(3));
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp 1127, 1140 (1970) (enjoining IRS from granting tax-exempt status under
§§ 170 and 501(c)(3) to racially segregated private schools in Mississippi).
28. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (stating that "past discrimination cannot, in the
manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful"); cp. Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
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courts, created the historical context in which testator Jack Adams believed his
grant would be legal and enforceable. By 1990, the Virginia Supreme Court
appeared to have forgotten this history or else to have underestimated its legal
relevance.
In Hermitage Methodist Homes, this article will argue, the Virginia
Supreme Court's very avoidance of the constitutional question was itself
unconstitutional state action. Part H will recite the basic facts and holding of
the case. Part Ill will explain and criticize the property law principles by
which Virginia's highest court let the racially discriminatory will and codicil
deprive African Americans of equal protection of the laws. Part IV will argue
that the Commonwealth's legislative encouragement, executive support, and
judicial enforcement of the testamentary provisions were unconstitutional state
action. Part V will contend that the Virginia Supreme Court's application of
the avoidance doctrine compounded the unconstitutional state action that the
court had sought not to address. By way of solution, Part VI will call for a
more ambitious statutory abolition of the property-law distinction that
permitted the court to reach its conclusion, statutory prohibition of racial
discrimination in charitable trusts, prudential restrictions on application of the
avoidance doctrine, and political restoration of the balance between property
rights and civil rights.
The court claimed not to be deciding whether the racially discriminatory
provisions were valid or void.29 It also claimed not to be enforcing them, if
they were in fact invalid.30 Logically extended, however, the court's
interpretation of the will and application of property law created a "safe
harbor" for racial discrimination.3
The court explicitly kept open the
possibility that in a future case it would permit a will to terminate a nondiscriminatory school's present interest and deliver that interest to a discriminatory school instead, if the testator named the latter in a carefully worded gift
over.32 Seen in the larger historical context of an ever-shifting "property

No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (holding that finding of intentional segregation in portion of school system

led to presumption of segregation in others, not excused by remoteness in time).
29. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 744 (stating that, whether discriminatory
provisions were valid or void, case would come out same way).
30. See id. at 746 (stating that interests of educational charities named successively in will failed
completely "not because we give effect to an invalid trust provision," and thereby implying either that court
did not give effect to provision or that provision was valid).
31. See Entin, supra note 2, at 769 (speculating that perpetrators of racial discrimination could use
essentially semantic distinction between special limitations and conditions subsequent to create
constitutional "safe harbor").
32. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746 (stating that "because as counsel have

represented, the educational institutions [named successively in will] have all admitted black students, their
respective interests in the trust proceeds can never vest into possession"-implying that if such schools had
not admitted blacks, gifts over might or might not vest).
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rights/civil rights dichotomy,"33 the court's decision protected property rights
more vigorously than civil liberties. It thus marked a retreat from the Carolene
Productsera of highly protected suspect classes and fundamental rights,34 back
to the Lochner era of economic due process and laissez-faire.35
Ultimately, the court, like the school that lost income through the decision,
resembled Dorothea Brooke, the protagonist of George Eliot's Middlemarch.36
A codicil to the will of Brooke's dead husband, Edward Casaubon, would
divest her of property if she married Will Ladislaw, whom Casaubon had
disliked. 3 Whether she married Ladislaw and lost the property, or remained
single and kept it, her late husband's intentions would still control her.38 The
testator in Hermitage Methodist Homes similarly controlled the Virginia
Supreme Court, despite its protestations that it was merely applying the
avoidance doctrine.

II.

THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF HERMITAGE METHODIST HOMES

In Hermitage Methodist Homes, Lynchburg testator Jack Adams's duly
executed will and codicil declared his intention that his estate be held in trust
and that the trustee distribute the trust's income to the Prince Edward School
Foundation "so long as" the private school it supported admitted only white
persons.39 "In the event that" the school admitted any non-white student, the
trust's income would go instead to a second school, "so long as" it, too,
admitted only whites. 4° "In the event that" the second school also admitted a
33. See David Schultz, Scalia, Property, and Dolan v. Tigard: The Emergence of a Post-Carolene
Products Jurisprudence, 29 AKRON L. REV. 1, 20-34 (1995) (arguing that Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, by
rethinking Carolene Products era jurisprudence, had increased civil rights' vulnerability to political
process).
34. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (indicating that
economic regulation was subject to rational-basis test but that legislation restricting political processes and
rights of discrete and insular minorities was subject to strict scrutiny).
35. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that statute limiting baker's work to
60 hours per week or 10 hours per day violated Fourteenth Amendment liberty of employer and employee
to contract).
36. See ELIOT, supra note 1, at 342 (describing widow's feelings about codicil restraining
remarriage).
37. See id. at 339 (explaining testamentary condition by which widow would lose property if she
married wrong person); cf. Shapira v. Union Nat' Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ohio C.P. 1974) (upholding
will that would divest two sons of residuary estate if they married non-Jewish women); Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999
U. ILL. L REV. 1273, 1315 (1999) (finding no constitutional objection to state court's enforcing testamentary
condition that affected religious practice).
38. See ELIOT, supra note 1, at 342 (stating that "the living, suffering [late husband] was no longer
before her to awaken her pity," but that "painful subjection" to him nevertheless survived: "As for the
property which was the sign of that broken tie, she would have been glad to be free from it.. . , if there had
not been duties attached to ownership, which she ought not to flinch from").
39. Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Va. 1990).
40. Id. at 742.
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non-white, the codicil provided for successive gifts over to yet a third school
and then to a college, both subject to the same whites-only contingency, and
finally, without limitation, to Hermitage Methodist Homes, a nursing facility.4'
The will and codicil, executed in 1956 and 1964, respectively, were probated
in 1968.42 The private school that was the first-named beneficiary, and that
admitted only whites, received the trust's income from 1968 until 1987. 43
By 1987, however, all three educational institutions named successively
in the will had enrolled black students." Dominion Trust Company, the
trustee at that time, filed suit to find out what it should do with the trust's
income. 45 Interested parties on several sides declared the racially discriminatory provision void under the Virginia and United States Constitutions, but
they then reached different answers to the central question: who should get the
money.4?

The Virginia Supreme Court's holding had three parts. First, the court
chose not to decide whether the racially discriminatory provisions were
unconstitutional and void.47 Second, the court found that, whether the
provisions were enforceable or not, the nursing home would ultimately benefit,
because a special limitation, rather than a condition subsequent, restricted the
interests of the successively named educational institutions and because, by
contrast, no limitation restricted the interest of the nursing home.4" Third, the
court decided that cy pres did not apply, because the testator clearly intended
a gift over to Hermitage Methodist Homes, after the Prince Edward School
Foundation's interest ended.4 9
ImI. FUTURE INTEREST LA WAS A MEANS TO A VOiD REACHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

This article criticizes the Virginia Supreme Court's application of property
law not only because the court thereby avoided a constitutional question but
also because the court ignored a relevant Virginia statute."0 Before grasping

41.
42.

Id.
See id.at 741.

43. See id. at 742.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.at 744.
47. See id.
48. See id.
at 746.
49. See id.
at 747.
50. See infra Part I.B. Furthermore, one commentator has suggested a second flaw in the court's
interpretation of property law: the court's having ignored respectable authorities that would delete the
offending provision while leaving the prior estate intact. See infra note 64.
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this potential error, a reader must understand the court's analysis of property
law.
A. The Virginia Supreme Court's Interpretationof Property Law
Virginia case law has sometimes distinguished between two types of
condition, occurrence of which may terminate a defeasible fee or life estate.
One such condition is a "special limitation" (what other jurisdictions call an
"executory limitation" or "fee simple determinable"), and the other is a
"condition subsequent."5' The words "from 0 to A for life, so long as A does
not remarry; and in the event she does, then to B" create a fee subject to a
special limitation.5 2 The words "from 0 to A for life, but ifA remarries, then
to B" create a fee subject to a condition subsequent.51
How do the two differ? Suppose that the determinative event occursthat, in the example, A remarries. If the will creates a condition subsequent,
A, on remarriage, does not lose her estate until the next beneficiary, B,
exercises an option to terminate the preceding estate.54 If, however, the will
creates a special limitation, A, on remarriage, loses her estate to B immediately
and automatically. 5 5 A fee simple subject to a special (executory) limitation
thus resembles the more familiar "fee simple determinable," which, if the
specified event happens, automatically reverts to the grantor (who holds a
"possibility of reverter"). 6 A fee simple subject to a special (executory)
limitation, however, is divested in favor not of the grantor but of a third party

51. See Dickson v. Alexandria Hosp., 177 F.2d 876, 878-79 (1949) (holding that, because will
devised property to wife of deceased only so long as she remained widow, and because it devised property
to others in event of her remarrying, words created special limitation rather than condition subsequent and
so produced defeasible fee simple estate); Vaughan v. Vaughan's Ex'x, 33 S.E. 603,604 (Va. 1899) (finding
that, because will reduced estate of decedent's widow in event she remarried, and because part she thus lost
would go to children, testator intended special limitation rather than condition subsequent); see generally
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 24-25, 45-46 (1936) (contrasting conditions subsequent and executory
limitations, as well as defining powers of termination); RICHARD R. POWELL AND PATRICK J. ROHAN,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY T!188, 189, 272 (One-Volume Edition 1968) (contrasting conditions
subsequent and executory limitations, as well as defining powers of termination).
52. See Dickson, 177 F.2d at 878 (distinguishing special limitations from conditions subsequent).
53. See id. (distinguishing special limitations from conditions subsequent).
54. See Neal v. State-Planters Bank and Trust Co., 184 S.E. 203,205 (Va. 1936) (stating that breach
of condition subsequent did not ipso facto execute forfeiture and revest grantor with title but that title
remained with grantee until grantor took appropriate action to revest self with it); Pence v. Tidewater
Townsite Corp., 103 S.E. 694, 696 (Va. 1920) (stating that, after grantee breached condition subsequent,
forfeiture did not execute itself, and that title remained in grantee until judgment of ejectment in grantor's
favor reinvested him).
55. See Trice v. Powell, 191 S.E. 758, 762 (Va. 1937) (stating that when will created fee simple
subject to special limitation, determinative event itself terminated estate).
56. See Entin, supranote 2, at 785 (comparing fee simple subject to executory limitation and fee
simple determinable, and contrasting both to fee simple subject to condition subsequent).
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(the person who holds an "executory interest"). 7 The Hermitage Methodist
Homes court strongly differentiated special limitations from conditions
subsequent,5" though this article will argue that a Virginia statute has limited
the distinction's continuing legal effect. 9
Moreover, if found unconstitutional, prohibited by a federal or state
statute, or void as against public policy or for some other reason, special
limitations and conditions subsequent demand different remedies. 60 Given an
unlawful condition subsequent, a Virginia court will strike the offensive
restriction but leave the prior estate otherwise intact.6' In the above example,
A will get her life estate, despite remarriage. In the case of an unlawful special
limitation, by contrast, Virginia will let the prior estate fail.62 In the example,
A will lose her interest. The HermitageMethodist Homes court went farther,
concluding that, if the prior estate failed, a gift over not subject to an unlawful
condition would survive.63 In the above example, B (not the grantor) would
take the estate.64
57. Id.
58. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Va. 1990)
(finding that if educational beneficiary violated restrictive provisions, its interest terminated immediately
without successor's having to invoke power of termination).
59. See infra Part LI.B.
60. See Meek v. Fox, 88 S.E. 161, 162-63 (Va. 1916) (stating that, when condition subsequent was
void, estate became free from condition, but that when special limitation was void, entire estate ceased).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746 (finding that nursing home's interest
survived because testator placed no limits on it).
64. But see Entin, supra note 2, at 777 (questioning precedential value of case on which Hermitage
Methodist Homes court relied, to decide outcome if prior estate was subject to unlawful special limitation
but gift over was not). Entin cites several authorities: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 65 and cmts.
e-f (1959); 4 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS ANDTRUSTEES § 211, at 13032 (3d ed. 1990); IA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILTAM F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 65, § 65.2, at 379,
§ 65.3 at 382 (4th ed. 1989). See Entin at 777 n. 43. According to Entin, when a special limitation is
unlawful, the common law rule usually strikes either the unlawful restriction alone, leaving the rest of the
prior estate intact, orboth the prior estate and the gift over, depending on the testator's intent-in either case,
not just the prior estate, as did the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 777-78. The court in Hermitage
MethodistHomes used as its authority the dictum from a 1916 case. See Meek, 88 S.E. at 162-63 (stating
that, when condition subsequent was void, estate became free from condition, but that when special
limitation was void, entire estate ceased), cited in HermitageMethodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746 (stating
that "[a]lthough it does not address the issue of what happens when a gift subject to a special limitation
offends constitutional considerations, the essential nature of a limitation as described by the court in Meek
points to the decision of the issue in this case"). In the three quarters of a century after 1916, observes Entin,
no Virginia court had ever before cited Meek as authority for the rule that an illegal special limitation
invalidated the estate to which it applied. See Entin at 777. Entin points to one far more recent potential
precedent supporting a different outcome: eliminating the invalid restriction while leaving the prior estate
intact. See United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 552-53 (W.D. Va. 1975) (ordering
Virginia children's home to admit black children, despite testator's intent to create orphanage for "white
children"), cited in Entin at 794 n. 110. In Hughes Mem'l Home, a federal court interpreting Virginia law
had ordered a Virginia children's home to comply with the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013619 (1994) (exercising Congressional power under Thirteenth Amendment to bar discrimination in
housing). Henceforth the home must operate on a nondiscriminatory basis. See Hughes Mem'I Home, 396
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Finally, according to the United States Supreme Court, the automatic
default associated with a special limitation's determinative event can enable
racially discriminatory special limitations to operate without state action,
thereby protecting them against a charge of having violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.65 Again, this article questions the
finding, when a later section examines the constitutional issue in Hermitage
Methodist Homes. 6
Table 1 summarizes the differences between a special limitation and a
condition subsequent, according to the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation
of property law.
TABLE 1.

POINTS OF CONTRAST BETWEEN CONDITION SUBSEQUENT AND

SPECIAL LIMITATION.

Condition Subsequent

Special
Limitation

Words that create
the interest

"but if"

"so long as," "in
the event"

Property-law
effect when determinative event
occurs (assuming
restriction is
effective)

Before taking, next beneficiary
must first affirmatively exercise her option to declare forfeiture

Estate vests immediately and
automatically in
next beneficiary,
without her
hav67
ing to

act

F. Supp. at 546. Applying cy pres and carrying out the testator's general charitable intent, the Hughes
Mem'l Home court excised a racial restriction deemed incidental to the trust's main purpose ("an orphanage
for.... white children"). Id. at 552-53. The HermitageMethodist Homes court, however, either overlooked
this case or deemed it distinguishable. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746-47 (affirming
trial court's ruling that cypres was inapplicable, because trust's purpose and beneficiaries were certain and
definite and because valid gift over expressed testator's intent). Perhaps the HermitageMethodist Homes
court did not see the Hughes Memorial Home will's provision "for the purpose of establishing, organizing
and maintaining an orphanage for... white children" as creating a special limitation, because the words "so
long as" and "in the event that" did not appear. See Hughes Mem 'l Home, 396 F. Supp. at 547 n. 2.
65. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1970) (finding that operation of racially neutral
common law, along with private parties' intentions, enabled trust to fail and land to revert without state
action, which would have violated Fourteenth Amendment).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. Arguing that a Virginia statute has changed the common law rule, however, this article questions
the Virginia Supreme Court's view that when a determinative event occurs, so violating a special limitation,
the next beneficiary's estate vests immediately and automatically, without her having to act. See infra Part
11I.B.
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Condition Subsequent

Special
Limitation

Remedy when
restriction violates
a constitution,
statute, or public
policy

Restriction is stricken, but
prior estate otherwise remains
intact

Prior estate is
forfeited, but gift
over not subject
to the invalid
condition68
survives

Constitutional
implications when
determinative
event occurs or
when law forbids
restriction

State action results

No state
action
results 69

Applying the above-stated law to the facts of HermitageMethodistHomes,
the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the whites-only provision was a
special limitation rather than a condition subsequent, because the codicil was
worded "so long as" instead of "but if."7 The court then assumed arguendo
two alternative premises: first, that the special limitation was effective; and
second, that it was not.7'
If the special limitation were effective, the court concluded, the firstnamed school's interest terminated as soon as it admitted a black student,
without any successor's having to invoke a power of termination. 72 The
interests of the second-, third-, and fourth-named beneficiaries would never
vest, the court found, because those schools already admitted blacks.73 Only
the nursing home's executory interest would survive, because the will and
codicil imposed no limits on it in the first place.74
68. But see supra note 64.
69. Arguing that the Commonwealth's legislative encouragement, executive support, and judicial
enforcement of the testamentary provisions were unconstitutional state action, this article questions the
Virginia Supreme Court's assumption that its application of property law did not implicate the government
in racial discrimination. See infra Part IV.
70. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 745 (Va. 1990)
(finding that testamentary provision at issue was not condition subsequent but special limitation).
71. See id.
at 744 (stating that "[w]hether the discriminatory provisions are valid or void, the result
is the same").
72. See id. at 746 (stating that violation of restrictive provisions terminated first-named beneficiary's
interest immediately).
73. See id. (finding that prior admission of blacks prevented interests of second-, third-, and fourthnamed beneficiaries from vesting).
74. See id. (finding that nursing home's unlimited interest survived).
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Even if the provisions were unconstitutional and void, however, the firstnamed school's estate would end, since it flowed from a special limitation and
was therefore itself limited before granted, rather than restricted
subsequently. 75 The court could not excise only the offensive language and
leave the prior estate intact, as it could with a condition subsequent that were
unconstitutional and void.76 In any case, the court
said, the gift over would
7
survive because no unlawful restriction tainted it.1
Because the nursing home would get the money in either case, the court
elected not to decide whether its own involvement, or that of Virginia's
legislative and executive branches, constituted "state action," and thus whether
the racially discriminatory provisions were unconstitutional and void.73 In
short, the court chose not to denounce the provisions because it believed that
whatever it did would not quash their effect.
B. Relevant Virginia Statute Ignored
Part IV will analyze and evaluate the Virginia Supreme Court's avoidance
the constitutional question. Another potential error, however, tainted even the
statements of property law on which the court relied. Namely, a Virginia
statute has changed the common law rule that, when a determinative event
occurs and violates a special limitation, the next beneficiary's estate vests
immediately and automatically, without her having to act.
According to section 8.01-255.1 of the Virginia Code, in pertinent part:
"No person shall commence an action for the recovery of lands, nor make an
entry thereon, by reason of a breach of a condition subsequent, or by reason
of the termination of an estate of fee simple determinable, unless the action is
commenced or entry is made within ten years after breach of the condition or
within ten years from the time when the estate of fee simple determinable has
been terminated. ' 79 This enactment focuses on real rather than personal
property"0 and therefore may not seem expressly applicable to the facts of
Hermitage Methodist Homes. Significantly, however, the code provision
equates a fee on condition subsequent and a fee simple determinable. 8 That
is, the statute treats no differently the right of entry that a successor in interest
may or may not exercise (associated with a condition subsequent) and the
75. See id. (stating that court would not excise offensive provisions alone but would terminate gift
that was subject to them).
76. Id.
77. See id. (finding that nursing home's unlimited interest survived).
78. See id. at 744 (assuming, but not deciding, that discriminatory provisions were inoperative).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-255.1 (Michie 2000).
80. See id. (imposing statute of limitations on "action for recovery of lands").
81. See id. (requiring action or entry, whether triggered by "breach of a condition subsequent" or
"termination of an estate of fee simple determinable").
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possibility of reverter that vests automatically (associated with a fee simple
determinable). 2 Add the assumption, explained above,83 that a fee simple
determinable functions the same way as a special (executory) limitation."' The
Virginia legislature thus has required the holder of a gift over, even one
authorized by a special limitation, to act affirmatively to perfect his or her
right.8 5 That the legislature has created a limitations period, after which the
action could not transfer title, reinforces the view that the gift over does not
vest automatically. 6 The required action and statutory period of limitations
together reverse the common law rule of automatic termination and
revestiture.8 7 The Virginia legislature must have intended to eliminate such
hypertechnical distinctions as the one that the Hermitage Methodist Homes
court used. 8 The Virginia Supreme Court thus overlooked the statutory
equivalence between special limitations and conditions subsequent.
The rest of this article argues that the testamentary provisions in
Hermitage Methodist Homes involved unconstitutional state action. Prince
Edward County's long history of state-supported racism in education fostered
the provisions, with encouragement from not only the state legislature 9 but
also the executive branch" and the county school board.9 Both judicial
enforcement92 and judicial avoidance93 further implicated the state, aggravating
the violation of equal protection rights.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS AS STATE ACTION

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
states from denying any person in their jurisdictions equal protection of the
laws.94 Legal classifications based solely on race, though not unconstitutional
per se, are immediately suspect, and courts must scrutinize them with
particular care. 9 A compelling state interest in remedying identifiable past
82. Id.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 56 and 57.
84. See Entin, supra note 2, at 785 (stating that "a fee simple subject to executory (i.e., special]
limitation is functionally identical to a fee simple determinable").
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-255.1 (Michie 2000) (requiring person to "commence an action" or
"make an entry," whether faced with condition subsequent or estate of fee simple determinable).
86. See id. (imposing ten-year limitation period for action for entry).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 54 through 59.
88. See Entin, supranote 2, at 787-92 (proposing unified law of defeasible fees, because form of
restriction should not control its constitutionality).
89. See infra Part IV.A.
90. See infra Part V.B.
91. See infra Part IV.C.
92. See infra Part V.D.
93. See infra Part V.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,cl.
2 (commanding that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
95. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that solely racial legal
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discrimination might rationally justify a narrowly tailored, affmnative action
plan.96 The racially discriminatory will provision in Hermitage Methodist
Homes, however, was hateful,' and Virginia's interest in preserving
testamentary freedom or educational plurality did not compel protecting this
form of conveyance, any more than public policy compels allowing a person
falsely to shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater. 98 The restriction would therefore
not survive strict scrutiny if a court considered suspect classification alone.
Indeed, no one has suggested that the will provision at issue would be
enforceable if it appeared in a statute. 99
Another factor exists, though. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
And only by "sifting facts and weighing
state action, not private.10°
circumstances," the United States Supreme Court has written, can one discern
"the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct'.'. To help
people fairly attribute private conduct to the state, the Court has articulated a
two-part test.'0 2 First, the "exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority" must cause the deprivation. 3 Second, an objective observer
must be able to describe the hurtful private party "in all fairness as a state
actor." 1t Lest the second prong seem circular, the Court has subdivided it into

classifications are immediately suspect but not unconstitutional per se); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating that "[d]istinctions between citizens because of ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality"); United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (stating that Court need not yet consider "whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
96. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (holding that, absent evidence of
past discrimination by City of Richmond or in local construction industry, city failed to demonstrate
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on basis of race).
97. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741-42 (Va. 1990)
(reporting that will and codicil conditioned gifts to Prince Edward School Foundation and its successors in
interest on their admitting "only members of the White Race," as testator defined that term).
98. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919) (stating that every free speech case raised
question of "whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent").
99. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 742-43 (paraphrasing arguments by Prince
Edward School Foundation, Miller School, Seven Hills School, and Virginia Attorney General that state's
enforcement of discriminatory provisions in will and codicil would violate Fourteenth Amendment, and
argument by Hermitage Methodist Homes that state's enforcement of same provisions would carry out
testator's plainly expressed intent, not state's).
100. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment applied to
State action only, not private action by individuals).
101. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (noting absence of any
readily applicable formula defining state action).
102. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (using two state-action
questions to clarify where governmental sphere ended and private sphere began); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982) (suggesting that cases alleging state action reflected two-part approach to fair
attribution).
103. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. at 620.
104. Id.
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three parts1 °5 The fairness of describing the private party as a state actor
depends on the extent to which: (a) the allegedly depriving party relies on
"governmental assistance and benefits"; 0 6 (b) the party performs "a traditional
govern-mental function";'0 7 and (c) "the incidents of governmental authority"
uniquely aggravate the injury.0 8 Table 2 below summarizes these factors of
state action.
TABLE 2. FACTORS OF STATE ACTION, AS DEFINED IN EDMONSON V. LEESVILLE
CONCRETE COMPANY,'0 9 CORRELATED WITH ROLES PLAYED BY BRANCHES OF
THE VIRGINIA GOVERNMENT.

State action
"exercise of a
right or privilege
having its source
in state
authority"

Ability to describe the hurtful party "in all fairness
as a state actor"

105. See id. at 621-22 (extracting, from Court's previous cases, three principles of general application
for determining whether law in all fairness could describe private party as government actor).
106. Id. at 621; see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966) (finding that city's maintenance
of racially segregated private park was unconstitutional state action because it implied government approval
of racial discrimination); Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (stating that racial discrimination by restaurant located
in government facility and leasing space from it was state action even though restaurant received no
government subsidy); but see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-52 (finding that government regulation of public
utility and grant of monopoly status to it, did not implicate state in utility's terminating service without
notice); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 177 (holding that government's grant of liquor license to racially
discriminatory private club did not constitute state action).
107. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. at 621; see Newton, 382 U.S. at 301-02 (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited city from allowing private trustee to operate racially segregated park because
operation of park was traditional government function); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,469 (1953) (finding
that Fifteenth Amendment applied to private club's election of nominees for Democratic primary because
operation of election system was traditional government function); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,507-09
(1946) (finding that company town's not letting Jehovah's Witness distribute leaflets violated First and
Fourteenth Amendments because regulation of residential and commercial districts was traditional
government function); but see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (finding that operation of
privately owned shopping center, not in company town, was not traditional government function); Jackson,
419 U.S. at 352-54 (finding that operation of power company, despite monopoly status and licensing by
state, was not traditional government function).
108. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. at 622. Ultimately, the Leesville Concrete Court held that a private
litigant could not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race, because the jury selection
system was an essential public function and because state involvement therefore violated the Fifth
Amendment rights of the challenged juror. Id. at 616; see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-59 (1953)
(stating that court's imposition of civil damages against property owner who breached racially restrictive
covenant, by selling to minority buyer, was unconstitutional state action in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (stating that court order enforcing racially
restrictive covenant, by enjoining property owner from voluntarily selling to black purchaser, was
unconstitutional state action in violation of Fourteenth Amendment); but see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,
439 (1970) (stating that city's letting property, previously devised to establish racially segregated public
park, revert to testator's heirs did not constitute state action).
109. 500 U.S. 614 (1991); see id. at 620-22.
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State action
[ Virinia
legislature's
role]
"governmental
assistance and
benefits"

[Virginia
executive
branch'srole]

"traditional
government
function"
[County
School
Board's Role]

"incidents of
governmental
authority"
[Virinia
iudiarv's
role]

The Prince Edward School Foundation's racial discrimination involved
state action in at least four ways. First, the Commonwealth's legislative
encouragement made "state authority" the "source" of the right that the trust
exercised." 0 Second, executive support--especially the attorney general's
obligation to administer the trust's terms, should a private trustee ever refuse
to do so-imbued the testamentary provision with "governmental assistance
and benefits.""' Third, the Prince Edward County School Board's Massive
Resistance, closing all public schools, delegated to racially discriminatory
private schools a quasi-"public function."' 12 Fourth, judicial enforcement of
the testamentary provisions in the Hermitage Methodist Homes case itself
caused the "incidents of governmental authority" uniquely to aggravate the
injury.

113

A. The Virginia Legislature'sRole: "Right or PrivilegeHaving its
Source in State Authority"
The facts of Hermitage Methodist Homes satisfy the first prong of the
Leesville Concrete test ("exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority") because the Virginia legislature mandated that the will contain
the racial restriction." 4 When the testator died, the Virginia Code permitted
110.
11I.
112.
113.

See infra PartlV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra PartlV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.

114. Also relevant is that the Virginia Legislature created the right to convey property to a charitable
trust in the first place, given that the testator's exercise of this right caused the alleged deprivation. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-26.1 (Michie 2000) (validating almost any "gift, grant, devise or bequest" made for
"literary purposes," for "education," or for "charitable purposes," as if the donor had made it "to or for the
benefit if a certain natural person"). State action here created not the right to draft a will but the right to fill
a charitable mist with assets. The Virginia Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the Code allowed
charitable bequests that would otherwise not exist: "There was a time in the life of this State when
charitable bequests were not valid... The attainment of this desired end was in the power of the legislature
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charitable conveyances for "the education of white persons" or for "the
education of colored persons," but not for the education of both,
commingled. "5 In 1937 the Virginia Supreme Court expressly interpreted this
statute as not permitting gifts to integrated schools." 6 Indeed, the Virginia
Constitution at that time even prohibited integrated schools." t 7 The revised
Virginia Constitution of 1971 eliminated this prohibition, and the General
Assembly repealed the offensive statute on charitable gifts in 1975, replacing
it the next year with nondiscriminatory language." 8 Thus, the segregationist
legislation and Constitution were still effective during the years the testator
executed his will and codicil, as well as in the year he died. " 9 The state
therefore did not merely create the testator's capacity to devise his property to
a charitable trust 12° but also dictated the racially discriminatory form his gift
took. He had no choice. Virginia's mandate itself was unconstitutional. The
Hermitage Methodist Homes court acknowledged this history in its statement
of facts 12' but disregarded it when rendering an opinion.'
The government of Virginia might counter by pointing to a causal gap
between the statute and the will: the testator could have acted as he did even
without the Commonwealth's prodding." 3 That objection, however,
misinterprets this article's argument as contending that the private schools and
the testator were themselves state actors. Rather, the state legislatureacted
unconstitutionally in its proffered aid. A state may not legislatively encourage
and it has exercised it."
Roller v. Shaver, 17 S.E.2d 419,423-24 (Va. 1941).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-26 (Michie 1942) (repealed 1975).
116. See Triplett v. Trotter, 193 S.E. 514, 516 (Va. 1937) (concluding that Virginia Code permitted
gift to establish college for "worthy and dependent young men" only if trustee interpreted phrase as meaning
either white or non-white students, but not both).
117. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 140 (1942) (repealed 1971) (commanding that "[wihite and colored
children shall not be taught in the same school").
118. 1975 VA. AcTs ch. 547; see Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d
740, 742 (Va. 1990) (reporting that Commonwealth repealed Va. Code Ann. § 55-26 in 1974 and replaced
it with present § 55-26.1 in 1976).
119. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 741 (stating that testator executed will and
codicil in 1956 and 1964 respectively, and that he died in 1968).
120. See supra note 114.
121. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Virginia Code § 55-26 and
summarizing Triplett'sinterpretation of it), 743 (paraphrasing school's allegations that Virginia Code § 5526 compelled testator's discrimination and that divestiture would give continuing effect to statute), and 74445 (paraphrasing school's argument that Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of Virginia Code § 55-26
in Triplett compelled testator's discrimination).
122. Id at 745 (assuming but not deciding that will's racially restrictive provisions were
unconstitutional).
123. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (finding no "indication that Senator Bacon in
drawing up his will was persuaded or induced to include racial restrictions by the fact that such restrictions
were permitted by the Georgia statutes"); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 318 n. I (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(finding "absolutely no indication in the record that Senator Bacon would have acted otherwise but for the
statute, a gap in reasoning that cannot be obscured by general discussion of state 'involvement' or
'infection"'); Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312, 322 (W.D. Va. 1967) (reporting defendants'
denial "that § 55-26 compelled the testatrix to insert the racially restrictive provision in her will").
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private discrimination, even when the state does not compel it, as the following
case law indicates.
In 1973, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that decisions
on the presence of state involvement in segregated private schools' racial
discrimination did not turn on proof that a child enrolled in private school
would, if deprived of free state-owned textbooks, withdraw and enter public
school. 24 State aid to a discriminatory school thus violated the Constitution
even when "no precise causal relationship" showed that ending the state's aid
would end the discrimination." 25 If the state's conduct had "a significant
tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination," the
aggrieved party need not establish but-for causation to establish a
constitutional violation by the state.' 26
Foreshadowing this position, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia held in Sweet BriarInstitute v. Button' 27 that the
Commonwealth could not enforce a will limiting the recipient institution's
enrollment to "white girls and young women.' 28 Section 140 of the Virginia
Constitution, section 55-29 of the Virginia Code, section 55-26 of the Virginia
Code, and the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the latter, the Sweet
Briar court found, involved state action, even though the will could have

124. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973) (stating that court's finding of state
involvement in racially discriminatory admissions policies of schools to which it lent textbooks did not
require establishment of but-for causation).
125. Id. at466.
126. Id.
127. 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967).
128. See Sweet Briar Inst. v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967) (holding that Virginia could
not enforce racially discriminatory provision in will of college's founder, because enforcement would
constitute state action barred by Fourteenth Amendment). In Sweet Briar, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia considered whether the Commonwealth could enforce a testamentary
restriction by which the founder of Sweet Briar Institute limited enrollment to "white girls and young
women." Id. at 312. Having matriculated a non-white applicant as a precondition to receiving federal aid,
the college as trustee brought suit to enjoin Virginia's Attorney General and the Commonwealth's Attorney
of Amherst County from enforcing the racial restriction. Id. at 312-13. Following the United States
Supreme Court's express holding in Pennsylvaniav. Boardof Dirs.of City Trusts of Philadelphia,353 U.S.
for Girard College when it denied admission to two
230, 231 (1957) (holding that, though acting as trustee
non-white applicants solely on basis of race, Philadelphia's Board of Directors of City Trusts was state actor
and so violated Fourteenth Amendment), the Sweet Briar court found unconstitutional state action in four
texts, inter alia: (1)section 55-26 of the Virginia Code of 1950, which validated charitable trusts for
education only when the institutions they created let whites or non-whites attend but not both; (2) the
Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the above statute, as expressed in Triplett v. Trotter, 193 S.E.
514, 515 (Va. 1937) (interpreting the Virginia Code as allowing trustees to accept applicants from one racial
class or the other, but not to accept applicants from both); (3) section 55-29 of the Virginia Code, which
empowered state courts, on a motion of the commonwealth's attorney, to replace any trustee who refused
to act in accordance with the testator's intent; and (4) section 140 of the Virginia Constitution, forbidding
the education of whites and non-whites in the same school. Id. at 313 and 320. The Sweet Briar court
therefore held that Virginia could not enforce the racially discriminatory provision in the will of the
institute's founder because enforcement would constitute state action barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.
id. at 312.
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discriminated, without them. 29 In other words, the Commonwealth had
legislatively encouraged the Sweet Briar testator to create a racially
discriminatory will.
Concurring and dissenting opinions from the United States Supreme Court
cases of Evans v. Newton' 30 and Evans v. Abney" -both involving efforts by
the City of Macon, Georgia, to transfer a racially segregated park from the
public to the private sector 32-- argued similarly. The majority in Newton
found that new private trustees could not, without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment, give effect to a charitable trust's racial condition that Macon
itself had been enforcing. 3 3 The majority reasoned that the park served a
public function and had received public benefits, 34 but a footnote observed
that the opinion deliberately did not reach the question of whether Georgia's

129. See id. at 313 and 320-22 (finding unconstitutional state action in all four texts).
130. 382 U.S. 396 (1966).
131. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
132. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-302 (1966) (holding that mere substitution of trustees
did not per se transfer racially segregated park from public to private sector because park's history and
function firmly established municipal control); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (stating that in
refusing to apply cy pres, allowing trust to fail, and letting park property revert to testator's heirs, Georgia
courts did no more than apply well-settled principles of Georgia law to determine Georgia will's meaning
and effect). In Newton, the Supreme Court considered whether a state court's appointment of new private
trustees after the City of Macon, Georgia resigned from that role, constituted state action subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection requirements. Id. at 297. United States Senator Augustus 0.
Bacon had devised land to the Mayor and Council of Macon, Georgia, thereby creating a park for white
people only. Id. After the City, alleging it could not legally enforce racial segregation, resigned as trustee,
a state court appointed three new private trustees. Id. at 298. According to the Newton Court, however, the
racially segregated park was for years an integral part of Macon's activities, as evidenced by the City's
sweeping, manicuring, watering, patrolling, and maintaining the park, as well as by its statutorily granted
tax exemption. Id. at 301. The mere substitution of trustees did not ipso facto transfer the park from the
public to the private sector, because the park's public character made it a public institution regardless of who
now had title under state law. Id. at 301-302. The Court thus held that, because the park's history and
function had entwined the municipality in the park's management, the park was subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection requirements. Id. In Abney, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether termination of the trust by Georgia's Supreme Court, after Newton made the testator's primary
intention impossible to fulfill, violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights
of Macon's black citizens. 396 U.S. 435, 437 (1970). Finding the park's segregated, whites-only character
to be an inseparable part of the testator's plan, the Georgia courts had on remand let the trust fail and its
property revert by law to the testator's heirs. Id. at 439. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
Georgia courts did no more than apply well-settled general principles of Georgia law to determine the
meaning and effect of a Georgia will. Id. When a charitable trust's main purpose failed, the Abney Court
wrote, not even Georgia's cy pres statutes could prevent the entire trust from failing. Id. at 440-41. The
state did not thereby penalize constitutionally mandated desegregation, the Court argued, because a private
party, not the state, had closed the park for racially discriminatory reasons. Id. at 444-45. That the will had
not expressly provided for a reverter in the event that the trust's racial restrictions failed did not make
Georgia's interpretation of the testator's intent gratuitously discriminatory, the Court suggested, because
the neutral operation of Georgia's trust laws closed the park to whites as well as blacks. Id at 445-46. The
Court thus declined to legislate social policy and called loss of the park merely the price Americans pay to
enjoy freedom of testation. Id. at 447.
133. Newton, 382 U.S. at 301-02 (holding that firmly established tradition of municipal control
prevented mere substitution of trustees from instantly transferring park to private sector).
134. Id..
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legislative action had facilitated the park's establishment. 35 Though Justice
White concurred in Newton,'3 6 he then went farther, seeing the trust as
"incurably tainted by discriminatory state legislation validating such a
condition under state law.' 37 That is, arguably "the validity of the racial
condition in Senator Bacon's trust would have been in doubt but for the 1905
statute," permitting charitable trusts dedicated in perpetuity to public use as a
park only if the park were segregated. 3
This statute, Justice White
hypothesized, "removed such doubt only for racial restrictions, leaving the
validity of nonracial restrictions still in question.' 3 9 If White's assumptions
were correct, such an enactment "would depart from a policy of strict
neutrality in matters of private discrimination."'" The statute would, in fact,
enlist "the State's assistance only in aid of racial discrimination.' 14' The
legislation "would so involve the state in the private choice as to convert the
infected private discrimination into state action subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 4 2 Perhaps Justice White overstates the argument here. The
school itself is not a "state actor;" rather, the legislature that aids and abets the
school's discriminatory admissions policy is. In short, the statute singled out
race for special treatment, favoring
private racial discrimination over other
43
1
discrimination.
private
of
kinds
Weakening Newton's holding that the city and trustees could not enforce
the testator's intent to run a park for whites only,'" the Court in Evans v.
Abney found that letting such land revert to the testator's heirs did not involve
state action.145 Justice Brennan's strong dissent in Abney, however, echoed
White's concurrence in Newton. Expressly permitting a testator to devise
135. See id. at 300 n. 3 (discussing potentially coercive effect of Georgia's policy letting charitable
trusts create segregated public facilities).
136. Id. at 305 (White, J., concurring).
137. Id. (White, J.,
concurring).
138. Id. at 306; see Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1964) (concluding that state legislation
requiring restaurants to provide separate toilet facilities for minorities made restaurants' racially restrictive
practices state action); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1963) (stating that city officials'
condemnation of sit-ins made stores' discriminatory use of trespass laws state action, even though stores
might have pressed charges against demonstrators anyway, without official encouragement); Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1963) (finding that state legislation commanding restaurants to
serve food on racially segregated basis made discrimination by restaurants state action).
139. See Newton, 382 U.S. at 306 (White, J.,
concurring) (concluding that Georgia statutes involved
state in private choice).
140. Id.
141. ld.
142. Id.
143. See id. (arguing that statute, by permitting charitable trusts dedicated in perpetuity to public use
as park only if park were segregated, elevated racial discrimination above other kinds of private charitable
intent).
144. See id. at 301-02 (holding that, because park's history and function had entwined municipality
in park's management, park was subject to Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection requirements).
145. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (deciding that Georgia courts did no more than
apply well-settled principles of Georgia law to determine Georgia will's meaning and effect).
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land for a public park only if it were racially segregated, wrote Brennan, the
Georgia legislature "undertook to facilitate racial restrictions as distinguished
from other kinds of restriction on access to a public park."' 4 6 When the
majority attributed the racially discriminatory motive to a private party rather
than to Georgia, argued Brennan, the majority "inexcusably" disregarded "the
State's role in enacting the statute without which Senator Bacon could not
have written the discriminatory provision."147
Beyond citing White's concurrence in Newton, Brennan's dissent in Abney
cited favorably 48 the United State Supreme Court case of Reitman v.
Mulkey.' 49 According to that case, a section of the California Constitution
preventing the state from limiting a person's right for any reason to refuse to
sell or lease property encouraged, and so significantly involved the state in,
private discrimination, even though the state did not compel it.'
"Encouragement" similarly describes the link between the Virginia statute on
charitable gifts and the racially discriminatory will in Hermitage Methodist
Homes. The Virginia legislature's requirement that any charitable bequest take
a racially discriminatory form involved the state in discrimination, even if the
gift could have taken the same discriminatory form without the state's
mandate.
The Reitman majority praised the lower court's examination of the state
law's constitutionality in terms of its "immediate objective," "ultimate effect,"
and "historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment. ' ' s5
This trio of concerns leads generally to another factor in state-action analysis,
"governmental assistance and benefits."' 152 Virginia's executive branch
supplied these.
B. The Virginia Executive Branch's Role: "Governmental
Assistance and Benefits"
Substantial assistance and benefits from the executive branch attended the
racially discriminatory legacy in HermitageMethodist Homes because the gift
created a charitable trust, 5 1 subject under certain circumstances to enforcement

146. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing facts of Abney to those in Reitman).
149. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
150. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (finding that California Constitution
impermissibly gave discrimination preferred legal status).
151. Id. at 373 (praising lower court's use of three criteria to examine constitutionality).
152. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
153. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741 (1990) (stating
that suit arose from charitable, testamentary trust).
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by the Commonwealth's Attorney General.' 54 Because it was charitable, the
trust enjoyed at least four privileges that do not attend other kinds of
testamentary trust. 155 First, it did not have to pay income tax on the donations
and interest it received, 15 6 and those persons donating money to it received tax
deductions.'5
Second, the trust was exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, which would otherwise prohibit grant of an estate unless the
interest had to vest, if at all, no later than twenty-one years after the death of
some person alive when the interest was created. 5 8 Third, if at any time the
gift's original purpose became impossible to fulfill, the equitable doctrine of
cy pres would enable a court to reform the trust's specific purpose, limited
only by the settlor's general charitable intent. 5 9 Fourth, and most importantly,
the state attorney general's office would enforce the trust's terms, should a
private trustee ever refuse to do so."W In other words, if a trustee refuses to act
and the Commonwealth's Attorney makes a motion in accordance with her

154. See id at 743 (reporting Attorney General's explicit request for interpretation of will and for
action not adverse to public interest in charitable trusts).
155. See Kathryn F. Voyer, Continuing the Trend Toward Equality: The Eradicationof Racially and
Sexually DiscriminatoryProvisions in PrivateTrusts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 943, 971-73 (1999)
(arguing that public policy alone should invalidate racially and sexually discriminatory private trust
provisions); Steven R. Swanson, DiscriminatoryCharitableTrusts: Time for a Legislative Solution, 48 U.
Prrr. L REv. 153, 175 (1986) (proposing model statute that would prohibit discrimination in charitable
trusts, because state effectively created them by granting benefits of tax immunity, attorney general
enforcement, and exemption from restrictions such as rule against perpetuities); Stephen J. Leacock, Racial
Preferencesin EducationalTrusts: An Overview of the UnitedStates Experience, 28 HOw. L. J. 715,723-24
(1985) (stating that racially discriminatory trusts should not qualify as charitable, because exemption from
rule against perpetuities, tax immunity, and ability to use cypres give charitable trusts special treatment not
accorded private trusts); Elias Clark, CharitableTrusts, the FourteenthAmendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard,66 YALE L J. 979, 979 (1957) (stating that law falsely assumes harmony between interests of settlor
and society by guaranteeing charitable trust's enforcement, perpetual existence and tax immunity).
1.56. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (exempting from federal income taxation certain corporations
organized and operated exclusively for, inter alia, religious, charitable, or educational purposes); but see
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (ruling that private school having racially discriminatory policy as to
students was not charitable within common law concepts reflected in 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 391(B) and
501(c)(3)); also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (holding that when nonprofit
private schools prescribed and enforced racial discrimination based on religious doctrine, they did not
qualify as 26 U.S.C. §§ 170 and 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organizations).
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (1994) (allowing tax deductions for certain charitable contributions).
158. See Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Va. 1951) (stating that trust
offending Rule Against Perpetuities was valid only if charitable and therefore public in nature). In a statute
applicable to nonvested property interests and powers of appointment created on or before July 1, 2000, the
Virginia Code now provides a kinder, gentler Rule Against Perpetuities. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12.1
(Supp. 2000) (adopting Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12.4
(Supp. 2000) (listing seven exceptions to statutory Rule Against Perpetuities).
159. See United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544,552-53 (W.D. Va. 1975) (applying
cy pres to let home for needy children operate on nondiscriminatory basis, because racial restriction was
merely incidental to charitable trust's main purpose); cf VA. CODE ANN. § 55-31 (Michie 2000) (stating that
indefiniteness of charitable trust's beneficiaries or purpose shall not defeat it).
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-29 (Michie 2000) (stating that when trustee refuses to act court may.
after Commonwealth's Attorney makes motion in accordance with duty, appoint replacement trustee, and
that Commonwealth may proceed against trustee when no other party can do so).
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duty, a Virginia court may appoint a replacement trustee.' 6' Similarly, the Common
wealth may proceed against the trustee when no other party can do so.' 62 Such
executive aid, privileging the trust in Hermitage Methodist Homes because it
purported to serve the public good, involves the state in the private testator's
action.
C. PrinceEdward County School Board'sRole: "Traditional
Government Function"
The County School Board's closure of all public schools when the testator
in HermitageMethodistHomes was creating his will and codicil involved the
state in discrimination through yet another factor of unconstitutional state
action: the private schools themselves arguably fulfilled a "traditional
government function.' 63
Some constitutional scholars will not accept this proposition. Arguing, on
one hand, that racially discriminatory private schools perform a traditional
public function conflicts with arguing, on the other, that they should lose their
tax exemption because,, being against public policy, they are not charitable.'"
In other words, given the shutdown of Prince Edward County's public schools,
the county's private schools performed a public function only ironically-to
the extent that racial discrimination was itself public policy in Virginia. Such
an argument equivocates, using the phrase "public policy" simultaneously in

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
164. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (holding that when nonprofit
private schools prescribed and enforced racial discrimination based on religious doctrine they did not qualify
as § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations). In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether two
nonprofit private schools that prescribed and enforced racially discriminatory admissions standards based
on religious doctrine qualified as tax-exempt organizations under § 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. Id. at 577. Bob Jones University denied admission to applicants engaged in interracial marriage
or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Id. at 581. Goldsboro Christian Schools denied
admission to children not having at least one white parent. Id. at 583. Both institutions challenged an
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling that would revoke the tax-exempt status of any private school whose
admissions standards clashed with a national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education. id.
at 579. According to the Bob Jones Court, an organization wishing tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3) must
meet two elements: (1) it must fit into a statutorily designated, presumptively charitable category (religious,
educational, etc.); and (2) it must promote common-law charity, both by providing a public benefit and by
not violating an established public policy. Id. at 585-91. Racial discrimination in education, the Court
stated, was against public policy. Id at 595. The IRS did not exceed its authority when it concluded that
§ 501(c)(3) embraced the common-law charity concept, as Congress subsequently showed by not correcting
the agency's interpretation. Id. at 599. Moreover, the government's compelling interest in eradicating racial
discrimination substantially outweighed the burden that denial of benefits placed on the schools' exercise
of religious freedom. Id. at 604. Bob Jones University's prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage
constituted racial discrimination, the Court found, even though the University allowed all races to enroll.
Id. at 605. Therefore, the Court held, neither Bob Jones University nor Goldsboro Christian Schools
qualified as tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3). Id. at 599.
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two very different senses. Even if "traditional government function" excluded
racial discrimination, not only governments fund schools. 6 5
Again, however, this article does not allege that the private schools or the
testator were themselves state actors. Rather, the County School Board was
a state actor, proceeding unconstitutionally when it constructively delegated
its public function to private contractors. The County not only knew they
would discriminate on the basis of race but also intended them to do so.
D. The Virginia Judiciary'sRole: "Incidents of Governmental Authority"
The facts of HermitageMethodist Homes also fulfill a final prong of state
action, aggravation of the injury by the "incidents of governmental
authority,"' 66 because the Virginia Supreme Court effectively enforced the
testator's discriminatory purpose against unwilling participants.
In Shelley v. Kraemer,167 the United States Supreme Court held that
enforcement of racially restrictive private covenants by courts in Missouri and
Michigan denied willing African American homebuyers the equal protection
of the laws. 68 Taking Shelley a step farther, the Court in Barrows v.
165. Cp. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (stating that any "service rendered even by a
private park of this character is municipal in nature"); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 450 (1970) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that heirs to whom Senator Bacon's property would revert became City of Macon's
agents-.-"a State cannot divest itself by contract of the power to perform essential governmental functions"
and "[tihe decision whether or not a public facility shall be operated in compliance with the Constitution
is an essentially governmental decision"); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (citing Terry) (stating that "[z]oning is a state and municipal function" and that "[w]hen the
State leaves that function to private agencies or institutions which are licensees and which practice racial
discrimination and zone our cities into white and black belts or white and black ghettoes, it suffers a
governmental function to be performed under private auspices in a way the State itself may not act"). An
objective examination, however, will distinguish the cases: a landlord-as-zoning-board and a private park
opened up to the public arguably perform more public functions than does a private school.
166. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. at 622.
167. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
168. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants violated Fourteenth Amendment). In Shelley, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether, by enforcing racially restrictive private agreements, state courts in Missouri and
Michigan had denied willing African American purchasers the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 8. In the
Missouri case, owners of property subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting occupancy by "any person
not of the Caucasian race" sued African Americans who had bought neighboring property subject to the
same covenant. Id. at 4-6. The Michigan case presented materially the same circumstances. Id. at 8. The
Shelley Court distinguished the facts at hand from those in two precedents (Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926) (upholding validity of similar covenant) and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (upholding
right of petitioners to challenge similar covenant)), because neither of the earlier cases had raised the same
constitutional issue. Id at 8-9. The Court further observed that the restrictive covenants at hand sought not
to proscribe a particular use of the property but rather to exclude a designated class of persons. Id. at 10.
The Court then asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only state action, not private conduct,
and that the restrictive covenants standing alone therefore did not deny anyone the equal protection of the
laws. Id. at 12-13. Judicial enforcement of the private agreements, however, did constitute state action,
because "the full coercive power of government" and "the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the State"
would restrain the actions of willing sellers and willing purchasers. Id. at 18-20. The Court accordingly
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Jackson'6 9 said that a state could not impose damages on a seller who violated

a racially restrictive covenant, because such judicial action coerced the holder
In Barrows, owners of
to use her property in a discriminatory way.'
residential real estate subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting occupancy
by "any person or persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian race" sought
damages at law for breach from a neighbor who had sold to African Americans.' 7' The Barrows Court found that judicially compelling the seller to pay
damages at law would be as coercive as granting an equitable injunction was
in Shelley. 72 "If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to carry
out her covenant," wrote the Barrows Court, "she is coerced to continue to use
her property in a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the purpose of the
covenant.' ' t73 Judicial enforcement of civil damages therefore constituted state
action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 74
In HermitageMethodist Homes, the Virginia Supreme Court allowed the
testator to cut off a private school's interest in a charitable trust because the
school now admitted African Americans. 75 Effectively punishing the school
rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that judicial willingness to enforce covenants excluding whites justified
enforcement of covenants excluding blacks and that not to enforce such private agreements violated their
constitutionally protected rights to hold property and form contracts. Id. at 21-23. The Court therefore held
that, byjudicially enforcing the racially restrictive covenants, the states had denied African Americans equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 20.
169. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
170. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1953) (comparingjudicial enforcement of racially
restrictive private agreement and court's making seller who violated such agreement pay damages). In
Barrows, the Court considered whether awarding damages at law against a co-covenantor who allegedly
broke a racially restrictive covenant amounted to judicial enforcement of that covenant in equity, violating
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 251. Owners of property subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting
occupancy by "any person or persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian race" sought damages at law for
breach from a neighbor who had sold to African Americans. Id. at 251-52. The Court cited Shelley's
holding that, while voluntary adherence to a racially discriminatory private agreement involved no state
action, judicial enforcement of that agreement against unwilling participants put the state's coercive power
behind the discrimination. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 253. The Barrows Court then found, by analogy, that
compelling the seller to pay damages at law constituted state action under the Fourteenth Amendment,
because a damage award was as coercive as granting an injunction in equity. Id. at 254. Such state action
would deprive African Americans of equal protection of the laws and thereby violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. Although the neighbors had sued the seller, and not the African American buyers, the
seller had standing to vindicate the African Americans' constitutional rights, because a damage award would
compel her to lose money. Id. at 254-59. In addition, the Barrows Court rejected the neighbors' arguments
that judicial refusal to award damages denied the neighbors themselves of due process and equal protection
of the laws, or impaired the obligation of their contracts. Id. at 259-60. The Court thus found that awarding
damages at law against a co-covenantor who allegedly broke a racially restrictive covenant amounted to
judicial enforcement of that covenant in equity, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 253-59.
171. Id. at251-52.
172. See id. at 253-54 (finding that compelling seller to pay damages constituted state action under
Fourteenth Amendment).
173. Id. at 254
174. See id (finding that judicially compelling seller to pay damages at law would be as coercive as
granting equitable injunction was in Shelley).
175. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Va. 1990) (stating
that, after black student matriculated, natural operation of will's special limitation terminated school's
interest in trust's income).
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with pecuniary loss (analogous to the damage award in Barrows), the
Hermitage Methodist Homes decision would coerce the unwilling school to
continue using the trust's income in a discriminatory way.
The Commonwealth might counter that the school was not entitled to the
testator's money, except in accordance with his wishes, and that any coercion
came from the testator, not the court. So had the United States Supreme Court
seemed to decide in Abney.176 Further support for this position might come
from Matter of Wilson, 177 decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in
1983. According to the Wilson court, judicial application of equitable powers
to allow a private party to administer a trust did not implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment, because the state thereby merely permitted private discrimination
but did not encourage, affirmatively promote, or compel it.'7 By analogy, a
court's enforcing neutral trespass laws, after a homeowner refused to let racial
minorities enter
his or her home, did not deny the trespassers equal protection
79
of the laws.
But even conservative constitutional scholars like John E. Nowak and
Ronald D. Rotunda would limit the application of cases like Abney and
Wilson: "Note that the principle of Evans v. Abney would not apply to a
176. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (deciding that Georgia courts did no more than
apply well-settled principles of Georgia law to determine Georgia will's meaning and effect).
177. 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
178. See Matter of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that, when court's
application of trust
law neither encouraged, nor affirmatively promoted, nor compelled private
discrimination but allowed private parties selectively to devise property by financing education of males and
not females, choice was not state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment strictures). In Wilson, the Court
of Appeals of New York considered whether two lower courts' facilitation of the administration of private
charitable trusts according to testators' intentions to finance the education of male and not female students
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1230-31. In one matter (the
Wilson Trust), a public school superintendent annually gave a private trustee the names of five "young men"
who had attained the best grades in high school science courses that year. Id. at 1231. In the other matter
(the Johnson Trust), a public board of education and high school principal themselves served as trustees,
selecting "bright and deserving men" who needed financial assistance to attend college. Id. In the former
case, an intermediate appellate court, exercising what it believed to be cy pres power, struck the clause in
the will requiring the school superintendent to certify the students' names and grades. Id. In the latter case,
the intermediate court, likewise seeing itself as exercising cy pres, eliminated the gender restriction to
overcome a perceived dilemma: on one hand, enforcement of the restriction by state actors-the board of
education and the principal serving as trustees-would violate the equal protection clause; on the other hand.
judicial substitution of a private trustee able and willing to enforce the restriction would, according to the
intermediate court, itself constitute impermissible state action. Id at 1232. The Wilson court, however,
distinguished a court's deviation power, which amended a trust's administrative provisions, from the cypres
power, which altered a trust's purpose. Id at 1234-35. Both severance of the school district's role in
certifying names (for the Wilson Trust) and appointment of a successor trustee (for the Johnson Trust) were,
the court found, more administrative than substantial. Id. Judicial application of equitable powers to let a
private party administer a trust, the court held, therefore did not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment,
because the state thereby merely permitted private discrimination but did not encourage, affirmatively
promote, or compel it. Id. at 1237.
179. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrtrrIONAL LAW § 12.3 (6th ed. 2000)
(stating that court may uphold trespass convictions based on private party's decision not to open home to
racial minorities).
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condition (or reverter clause) which would divest a property owner of the title
to his property if he attempted to sell it to black persons."' ° "Such a clause,"
write Nowak and Rotunda, echoing Barrows, "would be the equivalent of
monetary damages for failure to follow a restrictive covenant."'8 t Instead, the
court should "declare an end to the discriminatory practices" and do so
"without penalizing those who would use the land for racially neutral practices
and without encouraging racial discrimination in the future."' 2
In addition, Hermitage Methodist Homes differs from Abney, in that,
unlike Jack Adams's gift in HermitageMethodist Homes, Senator Bacon's gift
in Abney did not include a gift over. 8 3 Rather than enforcing the testator's
expressed wishes, as did the HermitageMethodist Homes court constructively,
the Abney Court allowed the trust to fail completely and its property to revert
by operation of Georgia law to the testator's heirs.8 4 Moreover, the Virginia
Supreme Court decided Hermitage Methodist Homes in 1990, whereas the
United States Supreme Court decided Abney in 1970. Given the historical
distance between the two rulings, the Hermitage Methodist Homes court
should not have decided so significant a case on property-law grounds.
Hermitage Methodist Homes also differs from Wilson, in that the former
involved racial discrimination, the latter gender-based discrimination.
Virginia's historical treatment of African Americans does not exactly parallel
New York's historical treatment of women. And the United States Supreme
Court has not yet explicitly ruled gender classifications to be suspect; for now,
they are subject to heightened, but not strict, scrutiny." 5
A counterprecedent to Wilson is Pennsylvania v. Brown, 8 6 which the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided in 1968.187 In Pennsylvaniav.
180. ld.
181.

Id.

182. Id.
183. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,297 (1966) (describing Senator Bacon's desire to create park
for white people only but not indicating his intention if trust ever failed).
184. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1970) (affirming Georgia Supreme Court's ruling
that testator's intention to provide park for whites only had become impossible to fulfill and that trust
therefore failed entirely).
185. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994) (finding that government attorney's
gender-based use of peremptory challenges violated Equal Protection Clause under intermediate level of
review, but neither confirming nor denying that gender might one day be considered suspect classification:
"We need not determine ... whether women or racial minorities have suffered more at the hands of
discriminatory state actors during the decades of our Nation's history").
186. 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); see Richard Raskin, Note,
[Recent Case: In re Estate of Wilson], 53 U. CIN. L REV. 297, 318 (1984) (stating that better rule than one
announced in Matter of Wilson would have had court exercise equitable modification powers to remove
discriminatory provisions, when state official's refusal to participate in discrimination made management
of charitable trust impossible).
187. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968)
(holding that state court's replacement of city board with private trustees sworn to uphold private college's
racially discriminatory admissions standards violated equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
In Pennsylvania v. Brown, the Third Circuit considered whether a state court's removal of the Board of
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Brown, a state court had removed the Board of Directors of City Trusts as
trustee of Girard College, a private institution created to educate "poor male
white orphan children," and appointed a private successor trustee, sworn to
enforce the racial and gender-based restrictions.'88 The court found that the
new private trustee's refusal to admit non-white applicants involved state
action, on three grounds. First, the close, indispensable relationship between
the College, Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania for 127 years implicated the state
in Girard's discriminatory intent.'89 Second, the state's involvement
paradoxically increased when it replaced itself as trustee, thereby deliberately
allowing Girard's intent to continue in effect.' 9° Third, the state court's
assumed power of appointment and reappointment significantly involved it in
the college's current administration, whether the state court explicitly wanted
the new private trustee to enforce Girard's will or not.' 9' What Professor Elias
Clark of Yale Law School wrote in 1957, commenting on an earlier incarnation of the Girard College litigation, 92 applied as well to the 1968 case:
"Accordingly, the administration of a charitable trust must ultimately be
characterized as state action."' 9a That is, "[wihether the trustee is a governmental unit, as in Girard,or a private trust company, the trustee's choice is
only first, not final."' 94 The court's enforcement power parallels that of the

Directors of City Trusts as trustee of Girard College, a private institution created to educate "poor male
white orphan children," and judicial appointment of a private successor trustee, solely to enforce the racial
and gender-based restrictions, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 123. According to the Third
Circuit, the new private trustee's refusal to admit non-white applicants involved state action, on three
grounds: (1) the ouster's historical context, (2) its immediate objective, and (3) its ultimate effect. Id. at
123-125. That is, (1) the close, indispensable relationship between the College, Philadelphia, and
Pennsylvania for 127 years implicated the state in Girard's discriminatory intent. Id. (2) The state's
involvement paradoxically increased when it replaced itself as trustee, thereby deliberately allowing Girard's
intent to continue in effect. Id. And (3) the state court's assumed power of appointment and reappointment
significantly involved it in the college's current administration, whether the state court explicitly wanted the
new private trustee to enforce Girard's will or not. Id. The Third Circuit therefore held that the state court's
replacement of the City Board with private trustees sworn to uphold racially discriminatory admissions
standards violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 125.
188. Id. at 123.
189. See id (finding state action in historical context of new trustee's refusal to admit non-white
applicants).
190. See id. (finding state action in immediate objective of new trustee's refusal to admit non-white
applicants).
191. See id (finding state action in ultimate effect of new trustee's refusal to admit non-white
applicants).
192. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230,231 (1957) (holding that, though
acting as trustee for Girard College when it denied admission to two non-white applicants solely on basis
of race, Philadelphia's Board of Directors of City Trusts was state actor and so violated Fourteenth
Amendment).
193. Elias Clark, CharitableTrusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66
YALE L.J. 979, 1008 (1957).
194. Id.
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state attorney general, implicating the government in otherwise private
discrimination. 9 5
V. A VOIDANCE AS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ITSELF STATE ACTION
In basing its opinion on "principles of real property law,"' 9 the Hermitage
Methodist Homes court applied the avoidance doctrine, as articulated by
Justice Brandeis: "Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."'9 Though
the Virginia Supreme court did not expressly say why the avoidance doctrine
applied to Hermitage Methodist Homes, respect for the other branches of
government generally necessitates judicial restraint. The court probably did
not wish to decide more than it had to. The United States Constitution
empowers the judiciary to resolve "cases and controversies," not to make
gratuitous constitutional generalizations. 98 And gratuitous judicial review
undermines majoritarian nile.' 99
In avoiding constitutional questions when a deprivation of rights
belonging to discrete and insular minorities presents them, however, courts
breach the separation of powers just as much as when they step on the toes of
legislatures. 2°° A constitutional question was central to the Hermitage
Methodist Homes case. If the judiciary has no duty to address constitutional
questions when a case presents them, and nothing but them, 2°! why does the
judiciary exist? 2 2 According to the United States Supreme Court, if the parties
themselves press only constitutional grounds "the prudential rule of avoiding
constitutional questions has no application.' '2 3 In other words, "that there may
195. See supra Part V.B.
196. Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 744 (Va. 1990) (stating

that principles of real property law produced same result whether discriminatory provisions were valid or
not).
197. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(stating that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of").
198. U.S. CONST. art Ill, § 2, cl. I (empowering Court should exercise power of judicial review only
in context of deciding cases).
199. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 179, § 2.12(g) (offering pragmatic considerations behind
policy of judicial self-restraint).
200. See Lisa A. Kloppenerg, Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C. L REV. 1003, 1054-55
(1994) (describing circumstances where applying last resort rule to avoid constitutional adjudication
constitutes abdication of federal courts' countermajoritarian responsibility).
201. But see Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 743 (describing nursing home's motion for
summary judgment, based on argument that court should give language its plain meaning to carry out

testator's intent).
202. See Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
203. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
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be buried in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself
enough to invoke this rule." 2°4 Moreover, at least one commentator has argued
that the avoidance doctrine is not absolute. 2ss A court should reject it if
reaching the constitutional issue is the only way to repair a violation of
minority rights. 2 6
But one need not resort to such policy considerations to fault the ruling.
In Hermitage Methodist Homes, no non-constitutional grounds existed,
because every resolution entailed state action. Unfortunately, Hermitage
MethodistHomes is not the only case involving racial discrimination in which
an American court has avoided ruling on the merits. 2 7
VI. CONCLUSION

Given the problem's complexity, a satisfactory solution must combine at
least four actions: (1) more ambitious statutory abolition of distinctions
between a special limitation and a condition subsequent; (2) statutory
prohibition of racial discrimination in charitable trusts; (3) prudential
restrictions on application of the avoidance doctrine; and (4) political
restoration of the balance between property rights and civil rights.
(1) Statutory abolitionof distinctions between a special limitation and a
condition subsequent. The General Assembly should make more explicit and
generally applicable Virginia's partial statutory abolition of the distinction
between a special limitation and a condition subsequent. 208 A new statute
broader than section 8.01-255.1 of the current Virginia Code' would
expressly transform all possibilities of reverter and executory interests into
powers of termination, thereby both reducing automatic forfeitures and making
judicial enforcers keep equal protection in mind when scrutinizing their own
decisions. If, for example, such a statute had visibly governed the Hermitage
Methodist Homes court, it could not as easily have suggested that its
application of property law involved no state action. 0
204. Id.
205. See Kloppenberg, supranote 200, at 1005 (1994) (calling for less rigid applications of "last resort
rule").
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 228 (1964) (not reaching question of whether custom
alone- refusing to serve minorities and prosecuting them for trespass- turned private activities into state
action in violation of Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
208. See generally Entin, supra note 2 (using Hermitage Methodist Homes to argue for abolishing

limitation-condition distinction).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-255.1 (Michie 2000) (equating condition subsequent and fee simple
determinable, in context of action for recovery of lands).
210. See Hermitage Methodist Homes v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 744-48 (1990) (stating
that principles of real property law produced same result whether discriminatory provisions were valid or
not).
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(2) Statutory prohibitionofracialdiscriminationin charitabletrusts. One
proposed statute prohibiting racial discrimination in charitable trusts would,
except when the trust purported to remedy past discrimination, not only strike
any provision defining benefits based on a racial classification but also leave
the charitable gift otherwise intact.2" ' As applied to the trust in Hermitage
Methodist Homes, the proposed statute would have invalidated the objectionable restriction but would not have invalidated the gift beneath it.212 That is,
the testator could not lawfully have both enjoyed the governmental benefits
associated his trust's being deemed "charitable" and penalized the school for
racially neutral admissions practices.
(3) Prudential restrictions on application of the avoidance doctrine.
When an alleged constitutional violation involves minority rights, judges
should not merely "assume without deciding" that the violation exists. 2 3 By
applying the avoidance doctrine in HermitageMethodist Homes, for example,
the Virginia Supreme Court abdicated its duty to counter the traditionally more
political branches.2" 4 Prudential restriction on application of the avoidance
doctrine, by contrast, would have made the court reach the constitutional
question, take advantage of its relative insulation from political pressure, and
so protect the rights of minorities.
(4) Politicalrestorationof the balance between property rights and civil
rights. Arguably, the current United States Supreme Court has "retreated" to
the Lochner-era position, letting the demands of the market triumph over
personal freedom.21 5 Given that property rights are themselves civil rights,21 6
property right claims should protect individual freedom, not run roughshod
over it. Why, for example, should not the rationales of Shelley and Barrows
apply as much to testamentary restrictions on property interests as to
contractually created restrictive covenants? In a better political climate, the
211. See Swanson, supra note 155, at 191-92 (proposing statute to prohibit discriminatory charitable
trusts).
212. See Hermitage Methodist Homes, 387 S.E.2d at 746 (stating that if educational beneficiary
violated restrictive provisions, its interest terminated immediately, without successor having to invoke
power of termination).
213. See Kloppenberg, supra note 200, at 1047-55 (criticizing both overly cautious theory [positing
duty always to avoid constitutional questions] and overly daring theory [positing duty always to address
them]).
214. In the final analysis, of course, all branches are political, including the judicial. See FREDERIC
G. GALE, PoLrrItcAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 126 (SUNY Press
1994) (stating that critical theories "enable us to recognize the power of language to control, to dominate,
and to exploit, and that exploitation depends on ignorance, especially ignorance of the methods by which
language is used to accomplish political ends"; and concluding that "[a]wareness of the exploitive power
of language does not enable us to escape the social reality created by language, but it constitutes a movement
in the right direction, in the direction of self-empowerment and democratic citizenship").
215. See Schultz, supra note 33, at 34 (stating that Justice Scalia's "post Carolene Products" legal
philosophy constituted a "retreat to the market").
216. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538,551-52 (1972) (stating that federal courts
could not easily draw line between personal and property rights) (cited in Schultz, supra note 33, at 33).
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Virginia Supreme Court would have seen the Hermitage Methodist Homes
case as presenting not issues to finesse, but opportunities to engage. If the
court had only let property rights and human rights work together, the
Commonwealth could have partially
atoned for a time in its history when
17
property.
were
beings
human
Ultimately, application of the avoidance doctrine in HermitageMethodist
Homes spawned what Greek tragedians would call a "peripeteia"-areversal,
whereby the hero's own actions produced an effect opposite to the one
intended.2 1 The court in this case accomplished the very effect it purported
to prevent: enforcement of the discriminatory provisions. Perhaps some such
coercion flows from any gratuitous transfer. 9 Striving to escape the dead
hand's grasp, both a private entity and a state actor unavoidably embraced it,
thereby letting prejudices solid and subtle infuse the darkness. 2'

217. See Entin, supra note 2, at 797-98 (stating that HermitageMethodist Homes court "squandered
an opportunity to help Virginia come to terms with one of its most painful historical episodes," referring not
to slavery but to Prince Edward County's thirty years of Massive Resistance during school desegregation).
218. See ARISTOmE, POETIcs, Ch. X1, 19 (Leon Golden trans., Florida State University Press 1981)
(c. 347-322 B.C.) ('Thus, in the Oedipus the messenger comes to cheer Oedipus and to remove his fears in
regard to his mother; but by showing him who he actually is he accomplishes the very opposite effect.").
219. See D.W. Haslett, Is Inhiritance Justified? 15 PHILOSOPHY & PUBC AFFAIRS 122 (1986)
(arguing that inheritance contradicts capitalism's basic tenets); cp. STEPHEN R. MUNzER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY, 382 n. I and 409-I1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1990) (rejecting Haslett's argument because
abolition of gratuitous transfers would undermine reciprocity between generations).
220. See ELIOT, supra note 1, at 300 (finding prejudices to be "solid as pyramids, subtle as the
twentieth echo of an echo, or as the memory of hyacinths which once scented the darkness").

